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UNITED STATES V. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION:
STRIKING A BALANCE UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
BETWEEN EPA POWER TO PENALIZE AND THE RIGHT
OF STATES TO TAILOR REVISIONS OF THEIR STATE
IMPLEMENTATION PLANS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ap-
proved a Massachusetts State Implementation Plan (SIP) pursu-
ant to the Clean Air Act (CAA) l which governed the release of
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from automotive painting
operations in the state.2 The only plant affected by the SIP was
owned and operated by the General Motors Corporation (GMC).3
This original SIP required full compliance with emission guide-
lines by the end of 1985.4 However, in light of technological ad-
vances made in automotive painting operations, the EPA in 1981
issued a statement that provided states the opportunity to submit
SIP revisions that could defer for one or two years the emission
requirements for those who wished to take advantage of the new
technology.5 In November of 1984, GMC submitted to the state
1. Clean Air Act §§ 101-403, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V
1987)(hereinafter CAA).
2. United States v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 1060, 1063 (1st Cir.
1989), aft'd, 110 S. Ct. 2529 (1990). The EPA's approval can be found at 45
Fed. Reg. 61293, 61295 (1980).
VOCs react with the atmosphere to produce ozone. General Motors Corp., 876
F.2d at 1063. In American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, (D.C.
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982), the court described the effects that
ozone may have:
At certain concentration levels, ozone irritates the respiratory system
and causes coughing, wheezing, chest tightness, and headaches. Due to
its irritating nature, ozone can aggravate asthma, bronchitis, and em-
physema. Some studies indicate that chronic exposure to fairly low
levels of ozone may reduce resistance to infection and alter blood
chemistry or chromosome structure. Ozone can destroy vegetation, re-
duce crop yield, and damage exposed materials by causing cracking,
fading and weathering.
Id. at 1181.
3. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d at 1063. GMC had an automotive assembly
plant in Framingham, Massachusetts. Id.
4. Id. For a discussion of the CAA statutory framework, see infra notes 22-
38 and accompanying text.
5. Id. at 1063. In 1981, GMC was using lacquer-based paints in its plant in
Framingham. Id. That year the EPA issued its policy statement that lower-emit-
ting base-coat/clearcoat enamel systems had become technologically feasible. 46
Fed. Reg. 51366 (1981).
(581)
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a proposed revision seeking to defer the compliance date of the
original SIP without, however, switching to the new technology.6
Then, in June of 1985, GMC altered its plan and made a new pro-
posal to the state to convert its existing plant to the new technol-
ogy by the summer of 1987 which the state approved and
submitted to the EPA on December 30, 1985. 7
GMC continued to operate its existing plant and at the same
time began construction of a new plant that would employ the
new technology.8 Subsequent to failed multilateral negotiations
among the regional branch of the EPA, the state and GMC, the
EPA issued a Notice of Violation to GMC on August 14, 1986 for
GMC's failure to comply with the original SIP.9 On December 2,
1986 the EPA issued a proposed disapproval of the SIP revision
and on September 4, 1988 the EPA issued its decision rejecting
the proposal.' 0
Before issuing its formal rejection of the proposed revision,
the EPA commenced an enforcement action against GMC under
section 113 of the CAA for failing to meet the 1985 deadline set
by the original SIP."l The district court granted GMC's motion
for summary judgement reasoning that the EPA's failure to re-
view the SIP revision within four months, as the court believed
was required by the CAA, precluded the enforcement of the origi-
nal SIP after the four month period and prior to the disapproval
of the proposed revision. 12 On appeal by the United States, in
6. Id. at 1063-64. The revised SIP that GMC submitted to the state re-
quested the deferral in order to employ emission control devices to its existing
lacquer-based operations. Id. at 1064. GMC did, however, take advantage of an
innovative technology waiver for three other automotive painting operations
outside of Massachusetts. 47 Fed. Reg. 34342, 34343 (1982).
7. Id. at 1063-64. The second plan submitted by GMC became an "elev-
enth hour" revision as it was not submitted to the EPA by the state until one day
before compliance was required under the existing SIP. Id.
8. Id. Construction of the new plant was prior to the EPA's disapproval of
the SIP revision. Id.
9. Id. For a discussion of government enforcement procedures, see infra
notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
10. Id. at 1064.
11. Id. The EPA brought the action in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts on August 17, 1987.
12. United States v. General Motors Corp., 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 20853
(Mass. D.C. 1988). The district court followed the reasoning of its fellow district
court in United States v. Alcan Foil Products, 694 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D. Ky.
1988). The district court in General Motors Corp. found that the intent of the CAA
would be violated if the federal government had the power to enforce existing
SIPs while at the same time it proceeded indefinitely without ruling on a state's
proposed revision. General Motors Corp., 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 20853, 20854.
2
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United States v. General Motors Corp. ,'s the First Circuit reversed the
grant of summary judgement and held that while the four month
review period for original SIPs applied to revisions,' 4 the EPA's
failure to take timely action on a proposed revision could result in
a reduction of penalties assessed against GMC for violation of the
original SIP to the extent that the EPA delay was unwarranted.' 5
The First Circuit's holding embraced the majority view that the
CAA imposes a four month period for EPA review of SIP revi-
sions,' 6 but the court's additional holding further split the circuit
courts on the issue of the consequences that result from the
EPA's failure to review SIP revisions within the four month pe-
riod.' 7 Recently, on writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court in Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. United States,I8 held that the CAA does not
require the EPA Administrator to review SIP revisions within four
months,' 9 and that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 20
does not bar enforcement of SIPs when the EPA unreasonably
delays action on proposed revisions. 21 This Note will examine
the approaches of the First Circuit and Supreme Court to the res-
olution of the issues involved in the EPA's timely review of SIP
revisions.
13. 876 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 U.S. 2528 (1990).
14. Id. at 1066.
15. Id. at 1068. The First Circuit remanded the case back to the district
court for a determination of the reasons for the EPA's failure to make timely
review of the SIP revision and to adjust the penalties accordingly. Id. at 1068-69.
16. The majority view is that the four month period for EPA review of origi-
nal SIPs also applies to revisions. United States v. Alcan Foil Products, 889 F.2d
1513, 1518 (6th Cir. 1989); American Cyanamid Co. v. EPA, 810 F.2d 493, 495
(5th Cir. 1987); Council of Commuter Org. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 879, 888 (2d
Cir. 1986); Duquesne Light v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Council
of Commuter Org. v. Gorsuch, 683 F.2d 648, 651 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982). Only the
Sixth Circuit, before Alcan Foil Products, had refused to apply the four month
period to SIP revisions. United States v. National Steel Corp., 767 F.2d 1176,
1182 n.1 (6th Cir. 1985).
17. Prior to the First Circuit's decision in General Motors Corp., two circuits
had addressed this issue. In American Cyanamid Co. v. EPA, 810 F.2d 493 (5th
Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit held that EPA failure to make timely review of the
revision would bar the Agency from collecting penalties until a ruling was made
on the revision. Id. at 498-501. In contradistinction, the D.C. Circuit in Du-
quesne Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983), held that the EPA's
failure to make timely review of a SIP revision did not bar penalties, but the
penalties should be held in abeyance pending the decision of the proposed revi-
sion. Id. at 471-72.
18. 110 S. Ct. 2528 (1990).
19. Id. at 2531-33.
20. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)(hereinafter referred to as APA).
21. General Motors Corp., 110 S.Ct. at 2533-34.
3
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Air Act
The CAA states that one of its purposes is "to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources." 22 In an effort
to achieve this and other goals, Congress structured the CAA in a
manner that split the rights and responsibilities between the fed-
eral government and state and local governments.23 Thus, Con-
gress created a symbiotic relationship which generally mirrors the
federal system of government. 24
Under the CAA, the EPA, the federal agency in charge of ad-
ministering the CAA, is required to determine and publish a list
of hazardous pollutants. 25 The EPA must also promulgate Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) which specify ac-
22. CAA § 10l(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
23. Congress clearly intended for the states to play an integral role in com-
bating air pollution. The CAA states, "that the prevention and control of air
pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local govern-
ments . . ." Id. § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3). However, Congress also
gave the federal government a large role under the CAA. In the Act's declara-
tion of purpose it states that "Federal financial assistance and leadership is es-
sential for the development of cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local
programs to prevent and control air pollution." Id. § 101(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401 (a) (4).
24. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1981)
(where court draws parallel between division of power among states and federal
government in CAA and federal system of government generally).
The history of the CAA and its amendments has become part of the increas-
ing role played by the federal government in combating air pollution. The CAA
was originally enacted in 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392. The original
CAA granted the federal government a comparatively modest role by granting it
the authority to increase research efforts, to make grants to state air pollution
control agencies, and to play a role, under certain circumstances, in interstate
pollution. The next major amendments came in the form of the Air Quality Act
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485. These Amendments increased the
role of the federal government by granting it limited powers of supervision and
enforcement. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Star. 1676, further increased the role of the federal government by requiring
.states to comply with air quality standards within a prescribed timetable. One
salient aspect of the 1970 Amendments was to give the EPA the power to order
enforcement of applicable SIPs. CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
In 1977 Congress further amended the CAA, Pub. L. No. 75-75, 91 Stat.
712 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
These latest Amendments introduced an additional requirement for SIPs appli-
cable to "non-attainment areas," those areas which had fallen short of National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). Id. § 171(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(2).
The 1977 Amendments set a deadline of December 31, 1982 for primary
NAAQS, and granted further extensions in some cases until December 31, 1987
but required compliance with the NAAQS as soon as possible. Id. § 172(a), 42
U.S.C § 7502(a).
25. CAA § 108(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1).
4
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ceptable levels of the hazardous pollutants identified and
published under the CAA. 26
Section 110 of the CAA outlines the requirements and dead-
lines for SIPs, providing the states with a framework in which to
achieve and maintain the NAAQS. 27 The EPA then has four
months to review the proposed SIPs and to approve, disapprove,
or approve in part the submitted plans.28 The CAA provides spe-
cific guidelines for EPA review of submitted plans which restrict
EPA review to the substantive requirements of section 110 of the
CAA. 29 Thus, the CAA, by limiting the EPA's review process and
by imposing deadlines on the states, places restrictions on both
the federal and state governments creating a partnership in bat-
tling air pollution.
Not necessarily permanent upon approval, SIPs may be re-
vised under section 1 I0(a)(3).30 Revisions allow states to amend
their prior implementation plans in response to changed condi-
tions, improved technology, or reassessed needs.3' Section
110(a) (3) (A) states that a revision to an implementation plan must
be reviewed by the EPA in light of the requirements applicable to
an original plan set forth in section 1 10(a)(2).32 However, section
26. Id. § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409. The NAAQS are standards that the EPA is
required to publish for certain types of air pollution. Id. Since these standards
are uniform for all states, the NAAQS prevent manufacturers from "shopping"
among the states for the least restrictive environmental standards. Id. The
NAAQS were part of the 1970 Amendments to the CAA which required the EPA
Administrator to promulgate the standards within thirty days of the passage of
the Amendments. Id. § 109(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1).
27. Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410. This section requires each state to submit
a SIP within nine months after the promulgation of the NAAQS. Id. § 1 10(a)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
The 1977 Amendments to the CAA added an additional requirement for a
"nonattainment area," an area where the air quality falls short of the NAAQS.
Id. § 171(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2).
28. Id. 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2). The CAA requires that:
[t]he Administrator shall, within four months after the date required for
submission of a plan under paragraph (1) [section 110(a)(1)], approve
or disapprove such plan, or any portion thereof. The Administrator
shall approve such plan, or any portion thereof, if he determines that it
was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and that ..
Id.
The statute goes on to list the substantive requirements needed for ap-
proval. Id. § 110(a)(2)(A)-(K), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)-(K). With EPA ap-
proval of the states' SIPs, the start-up stage of the CAA was completed.
29. Id. § 1 10(a)(2)(A)-(K), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)-(K).
30. Id. § 110(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3). For the text of § l10(a)(3)(A),
see infra note 32.
31. The CAA does not require states to make any showing in order to re-
vise its SIPs.
32. Id. § 1 10(a)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(A). The Act states that "[tihe
5
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1 10(a)(3)(A) is silent as to the deadline for EPA review.33
Should a party fail to comply with emission requirements of
an "applicable implementation plan,"3 4 the CAA provides two av-
enues for government enforcement. First, section 113 authorizes
the EPA to institute federal enforcement actions.3 5 Under this
section, the EPA is empowered to issue orders requiring compli-
ance with applicable SIPs, to commence civil suits for injunctions,
and to assess criminal penalties for knowing violations.3 6 Second,
section 120 authorizes the EPA to issue an administrative order
for assessment and collection of a noncompliance penalty.3 7 Sec-
tion 120 is designed to add an additional incentive for noncom-
plying sources to meet emission standards by measuring the
penalties to be imposed by the value of noncompliance. 38 In ad-
dition to government enforcement, the CAA also provides that
any person may bring a citizen's suit against a person in violation
of an emission standard, order of the Administrator, or against
the Administrator to compel agency action.39
In addition to the CAA, the APA also places requirements on
the Administrator of the EPA. Specifically, the EPA is under a
Administrator shall approve any revision of an implementation plan applicable
to an air quality control region if he determines that it meets the requirements of
paragraph (2) and has been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and
public hearings." Id.
33. See supra note 32 for the text of section 110(a)(3)(A) of the CAA.
34. The CAA defines an "applicable implementation plan" as: "the imple-
mentation plan, or most recent revision thereof, which has been approved under
subsection (a) of this section [section 110] or promulgated under subsection (c)
of this section and which implements the requirements of this section." Id.
§ I10(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(d).
The existing SIP is the "applicable implementation plan" until a revision
has been approved. See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 92 (1975).
35. CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413. This section of the CAA permits the
Administrator to bring an action in federal district court against the noncomply-
ing person.
36. Id. Under section 113, the EPA must first notify the noncomplying per-
son. If after thirty days after notification the person is still in violation of the
applicable standards, the EPA may issue an order to comply with the applicable
standards or may bring a civil suit against the noncomplying person. Id.
§ 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1).
37. Id. § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 7420.
38. Id. Section 120, part of the 1977 amendments to the CAA, expanded
the enforcement scheme to include noncompliance penalties. Section 120 is an
administrative process whereby the EPA assesses and collects the penalty for
noncompliance subject to judicial review under subsection (e) of section 120.
Thus, this section differs from section 113 not only in the nature of the penalty
assessed, but also in the degree to which the EPA is the assessor.
39. Id. § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. This section provides that civil suits may
be commenced against the Administrator for his or her failure to perform a non-
discretionary act or duty. Id.
6
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general duty to conclude matters before it in a "reasonable
time."' 40 Should the EPA "unreasonably" delay an act it is obli-
gated to perform, the APA provides that a court shall compel the
agency to act. 4'
B. Deadline for EPA Review of SIP Revisions
In interpreting the CAA, an emerging majority of the circuit
courts has held that the Act imposes a four month period for EPA
review of SIP revisions. The Second Circuit was the first circuit
court to address this issue in Council of Commuter Organizations v.
Gorsuch.42 In Gorsuch, the state of New York was required to sub-
mit a revised implementation plan by July 1, 1982.43 The court,
while acknowledging an ambiguity in the CAA, reasoned by anal-
ogy to section 1 10(a)(2), which limits the EPA to a four month
decision-making period, and found that the EPA was required to
rule on SIP revisions within four months as well.44
With little substantive analysis, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Duquesne Light Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency 45 also
held that the EPA was required to review submitted revisions
within four months.46 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit, in American
40. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
41. Id. § 706(1). This provision is similar to section 304 of the CAA. The
distinction between these two provisions is that suits brought under section 304
of the CAA are proper when the EPA is acting under statutory deadlines,
whereas section 706(1) suits may be brought when the EPA is acting under a
general duty to act within a reasonable time. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d
783, 791-92 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
42. 683 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1982).
43. Id. at 650-51. Congress had required New York to revise its implemen-
tation plan to include a provision for an improvement of its mass transit pro-
gram. Id. This revision was required by August 1, 1978. Id. New York submitted
its revised SIP by the congressionally mandated deadline. Id. The EPA ap-
proved the revised plan three years later on September 9, 1981. Id. The EPA
approval was, however, conditioned on the state's promise to submit subsequent
revisions by July 1, 1982. Id. at 650.
44. Id. at 651-52 n.2. The court resolved this issue in a footnote. As a
result, there is little indication of the court's reasoning.
The Second Circuit later reaffirmed this finding in Council of Commuter
Org. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1986). Again, the court offered little
analysis of its construction of the CAA on this issue. Id. at 888.
45. 698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court noted that section
110(a)(3)(B) of the CAA requires EPA review of a SIP revision within three
months if it was in relation to fuel burning stationary sources. Id. Section
110(a)(3)(B), unlike section 1 10(a)(3)(A), does explicitly impose a deadline for
EPA review.
46. Id. at 471.
7
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Cyanamid Co. v.- Environmental Protection Agency, 47 following the de-
cisions of the First and District of Columbia Circuits also held that
the four month limit applied to SIP revisions. 48 The court in
American Cyanamid stated that applying the four month review pe-
riod to revisions supported the relationship in the CAA between
the federal and state governments. 49
Only the Sixth Circuit in United States v. National Steel Corp. 50
has held the view that the four month deadline did not apply to
revisions. The court in National Steel found, also with little analy-
sis, that the four month review requirement for original SIPs of
section 1 10(a)(2) applied only to "general state plans submitted
under section 1 10(a)(1), not for revisions to state plans governed
by section 1 10(a)(3)(A)." 51 Thus, the court seemed to reject the
theory that the four month rule applied to revisions either explic-
itly or by analogy.
The Sixth Circuit later reversed its position in United States v.
Alan Foil Products52 and held that the four month review period
for original SIPs also applied to SIP revisions. 53 In Alcan Foil
Products the Sixth Circuit suggested that its prior comments in Na-
tional Steel were dicta54 and that the case had been decided on due
process grounds. 55 In joining the view of the majority of the cir-
cuits, the Sixth Circuit looked to section 110(g) of the CAA, a
section added in the 1977 Amendments which granted governors
special authority when SIP revisions are not acted upon within the
"required four months period,"'56 as a persuasive sign of a prior Con-
47. 810 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1987). This court also provided little analysis in
concluding that the four month review period applies to SIP revisions.
48. Id. at 495.
49. Id. at 495. The court stated that, "the statute [Clean Air Act] ... recog-
nized in the time limit the important role of the states." Id.
50. 767 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1986).
51. Id. at 1182 n.1.
52. 889 F.2d 1513 (6th Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 1515-18.
54. Id. at 1517. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the General Motors court that
the footnote regarding SIP revisions was "arguably dicta." Id. (quoting General
Motors Corp., 876 F.2d at 1066).
55. Alcan Foil Products, 889 F.2d at 1517. Referring to National Steel, the
court stated "[w]e concluded that all the circumstances, most importantly the
consent decree's provision prohibiting the use of a proposed SIP revision to
postpone compliance dates, negated a finding of a due process violation." Id.
56. Section 1 10(g) states:
(1) In the case of any State which has adopted and submitted to the
Administrator a proposed plan revision which the State determines -
(A) meets the requirements of this section, and
(B) is necessary (i) to prevent the closing for one year or more of
any source of air pollution, and (ii) to prevent substantial increases in
8
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gress' intent to require review of revisions within four months.57
C. The Consequences of EPA Failure to Timely Review
Revisions
Accepting what became the majority view that the EPA must
act on SIP revisions within four months, the ramifications from
the failure of the EPA to meet this deadline had to be determined.
The Duquesne Light court was the first circuit court case to address
this issue.5 8 The court held that after the four month review pe-
riod had passed, noncompliance penalties must be held in abey-
ance until the EPA rules on the revised SIP; moreover, if the EPA
did not ultimately approve the revision, the penalty is effective
retroactively with interest.5 9 In Duquesne Light the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit rejected two arguments put forth by the EPA.
First, the EPA argued that, regardless of how long it took to act
on a proposed revision, it had the authority to assess noncompli-
ance penalties pursuant to section 120 against sources in violation
of a present SIP, even though the source would be in compliance
with the SIP revision if accepted.60 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit stated that "[s]uch an inequitable use of the penalty powers is
neither called for nor authorized." 6' Second, the court rejected
the EPA's argument that section 304(a), under which a source
could petition to compel agency action, acts as a sufficient safe-
guard against dilatory conduct by the EPA. 6 2 The court, however,
unemployment which would result from such closing, and which the
Administrator has not approved or disapproved under this section
within the required four month period, the governor may issue a temporary
emergency suspension of the part of the applicable implementation
plan for such State which is proposed to be revised with respect to such
source.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(g) (emphasis added).
57. Akan Foil Products, 889 F.2d at 1518. The court noted that since section
110(g) was added by the ninety-fifth Congress it was not controlling on the issue
of the intent of the ninety-first Congress, but it also noted that the latter's inter-
pretation did have substantial weight. Id.
58. Duquesne Light, 698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 472.
60. Id. at 471. The court rejected the EPA's argument, in part, because of
the EPA's failure to take timely action on the SIP revision and on other dead-
lines required in the CAA. Id. at 471-72.
61. Id. at 472. The court asserted that allowing the EPA to collect such
penalties violated congressional intent as it might allow the EPA to collect penal-
ties when its prompt action on a revision would result in no penalties. Id.
62. Id. Section 304(a) of the CAA states, in part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-(1) against any person (in-
cluding (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instru-
1990] 589
9
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also rejected an argument put forth by the petitioners who sought
to have the penalties tolled at the time the deadline for acting on
revisions had passed.63 The court stated that its holding would
strike an appropriate balance: it would protect a source in com-
pliance with a revision eventually approved, but it would not al-
low a source in noncompliance to economically benefit if the
revision was rejected. 64
The Fifth Circuit took quite a different approach to this issue
in American Cyanamid Co. v. EPA.65 In American Cyanamid the court
held that failure to meet the statutory deadline would result in a
bar on penalties "between (1) four months after a state submits a
proposed revision and (2) the date the EPA rejects that revi-
sion." 66 The court noted two significant and hazardous effects
resulting from the holding in Duquesne Light. First, the rule devel-
oped by the District of Columbia Circuit in Duquesne Light pro-
vided no incentive for the EPA to act within the four month
period. 67 Second, the Duquesne Light rule, according to the court,
increased the danger that the EPA might reject pending revisions
which it ought not to reject.68 The court concluded that a bar on
penalties for the specified time, on the other hand, would create
an incentive for the EPA to act promptly and would not create an
inclination on the part of the EPA to reject revisions. 69 The Amer-
mentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A)
an emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard
or limitation, (2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a fail-
ure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).
63. Duquesne Light, 698 F.2d at 472. The court reasoned that to toll the pen-
alties after four months, when a revision would be later rejected, would permit
the noncomplying source to benefit. Id.
64. Id. The court ordered the EPA to promulgate a new regulation that
would require that the noncompliance penalty be held in abeyance pending the
EPA's final action on the revision. Id.
65. 810 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1987). Like the Duquesne Light case, this case
began by the EPA assessing a section 120 noncompliance penalty.
66. Id. at 500.
67. Id. at 499. The court reasoned that the Duquesne Light resolution of this
issue gave the EPA no incentive, as it calculated penalties back to the review
deadline with interest. Id.
68. Id. The Sixth Circuit looked at the facts before it in light of the Duquesne
Light rule and concluded that the EPA might be hesitant in approving the revi-
sion submitted by the state and admitting that the penalties were inappropriate.
The court stated that "[t]hese incentives may distort the EPA's even-handed ad-
ministration of the Act." Id.
69. American Cyanamid, 810 F.2d at 499.
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ican Cyanamid court found the statutory relationship set up in the
CAA between the states and the federal government to be an im-
portant element in the analysis of this issue.70 The court found
that the EPA's failure to act promptly on SIP revisions violated
the cooperative spirit that Congress had intended for the states
and the'federal government. 71
In Alcan Foil Products, a case decided after General Motors Corp.,
the Sixth Circuit held that the EPA must act upon SIP revisions
within four months and that, should the EPA fail to do so, penal-
ties could be assessed from the date of noncompliance; however,
the government must justify the EPA's delay if it was shown that
the plant owner was in compliance with a proposed revision. 72
The court stated that the most effective remedy for a party claim-
ing compliance with a proposed revision is found in section
113(b), which provides the district courts with discretionary
power in assessing penalties. 73 The Sixth Circuit further held
that if the plant owner established that it was in compliance with a
revision, the district court must balance the reasonableness of the
EPA delay with whatever prejudice the source can establish. 74
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. Deadline for EPA Review of SIP Revisions
In United States v. General Motors Corp. the First Circuit's deci-
sion was in accord with the majority view in the circuit courts. 75
GMC 76 argued that the structure and legislative history of the
CAA supported its view that section 1l0(a)(3)(A) incorporated
70. Id. at 499-500.
71. Id. The court believed that this element of the analysis had been lack-
ing in earlier treatments. Id. at 499. In fact, the court saw EPA cooperation as the
issue in the case. The court stated, "[t]he issue then is not so much pollution by
American Cyanamid but the default of the EPA in carrying out the congressional
intent to work in close cooperation with the states in implementing standards
and enforcing the Clean Air Act." Id. at 500.
72. Alcan Foil Products, 899 F.2d at 1517-21. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that
an enforcement bar would be too drastic and that courts should not assume that
Congress intended an agency to lose its enforcement powers merely because of
its failure to meet a deadline. Id. at 1520 (citing Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S.
253 (1986)).
73. Id. at 1521. The court expressed reservation about the effectiveness of
section 304(a) actions to compel the agency to rule on SIP revisions. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
76. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed an amicus curiae brief. The
state's brief reiterated some of the arguments made by GMC in its brief. General
Motors Corporation, 876 F.2d at 1065.
1990]
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the procedural requirements of section 1 10(a)(2), namely a four
month review period. 77 Specifically, GMC stressed that the struc-
ture of the CAA shows a congressional intention to give the states
an integral role in determining how best to achieve air quality
goals,78 as is evidenced by the substantive limits placed on the
EPA in reviewing SIPs79 and by the power of the states to submit
revisions to existing SIPs.80 GMC further argued that failure to
read the four month period into the CAA would, contrary to con-
gressional intent, give the EPA too much power, as it would es-
sentially give the EPA "pocket veto" over SIP revisions and
thereby hinder companies in making long range plans.8 '
The EPA, on the other hand, argued that the continued par-
ticipation of the states, while clearly envisioned by Congress, did
not depend 'on the imposition of a four month review period for
revisions.8 2 Moreover, the EPA argued that had Congress in-
tended a four month review period for revisions, it would have
explicitly required the deadline in section 1 10(a)(3)(A) as it had
done under other sections of the CAA.8 3 Lastly, the EPA argued
that the language of section 1 10(a)(3)(A) supported the view that
that section incorporated only the substantive requirements of
section 110(a)(2) because the word "it" in the later section re-
77. id.
78. In its appellate brief, GMC noted Congress' emphasis on the states'
role under the CAA:
Thus, for example, in considering amendments to the statute in 1977,
the responsible House committee reiterated that one of the Act's prin-
cipal purposes was "to give the States more flexibility in determining
how to protect public health while still permitting reasonable new
growth." H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1977). The
Senate similarly emphasized the need for State authority and flexibility:
"The authority of States and localities to implement air pollution con-
trol programs within the framework of a national policy must be en-
couraged. The framework proposed in this bill is flexible in terms of
the discretion in choosing methods for attaining firm national goals."
Brief for Appellee at 20 n.23, United States v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d
1060 (1st Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 1065. The substantive limitations placed on EPA review of SIPs
are stated in section 110(a)(2)(A)-(K). For a discussion of section 110(a)(2), see
supra notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d at 1066.
83. Id. The EPA argued that the four month review period for original SIPs
was necessary to put the regulatory framework in as soon as possible. Id. Addi-
tionally, the EPA believed that the four month review period for the original
SIPs was possible because the Agency had already done a substantial amount of
work on the matter. Id.
12
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ferred to the revision and not the Administrator."4
The First Circuit held for GMC on this issue, finding that the
states' interest in determining policy choices would be overly
compromised by not requiring the EPA to act within four
months.85 The court stated that it agreed with the reasoning of
GMC that Congress did not intend to limit the power of the states
to tailor SIP revisions by giving the EPA the power to review revi-
sions according to its own discretionary schedule.8 6
It is submitted that the First Circuit, and the other circuit
courts that have ruled on this issue, have not considered this mat-
ter of statutory construction in great depth.87 The First Circuit,
as well as the other circuits which have held similarly, placed little
emphasis on the fact that Congress, where it believed it was ap-
propriate, had explicitly included a number of deadlines in the
CAA.8 8 It is a rule of statutory construction that where Congress
includes a requirement under one section of a statute, but not
another, that that omission was intentional.8 9 Furthermore, while
the language of section 110(g) of the CAA does lend support to
the view that Congress intended to impose a four month review
84. Id. For the text of section 1 10(a)(3)(A), see supra note 32.
85. Id. The court stated, "[t]he states' freedom to make such choices obvi-
ously is curtailed to the extent that SIPs must be consistent with federal stan-
dards. It seems unlikely, however, that Congress also intended for the states'
legitimate policy choices to be held hostage to the EPA's schedule." Id.
86. Id. As GMC noted in its brief, "[t]he principle of deterrence upon
which the EPA seeks to rely here is meant to recognize agency expertise - not
to reward agency stubbornness." Brief for Appellee at 24, General Motors Corp.,
876 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1989).
87. In reading the four month review period into section 110(a)(3), the
courts have generally looked primarily to the structure of the CAA and the rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments as a sign of congressional
intent to include this limitation in section 1 10(a)(3). See United States v. Alcan
Foil Products, 899 F.2d 1513, 1518 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 1060, 1066 (1st Cir. 1989); American Cyanamid Co. v.
EPA, 810 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1987); Council of Commuter Org. v. Gorsuch,
683 F.2d 648, 651 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982). In gleaning Congressional intent from the
structure and purpose of the CAA, the courts generally have not expressed their
views on other issues of statutory construction.
88. See, e.g. CAA § l10(a)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § l10(a)(3)(B) (imposes three
month review period on certain SIP revisions involving fuel burning stationary
sources). The court considered this argument; however, it believed that this was
not a proper issue on which to defer to the EPA, as it had an institutional inter-
est in the matter. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d at 1066. Nevertheless, while this
may not have been a proper issue to defer to the EPA's interpretation, that did
not preclude the court from considering this rule of statutory construction. l
89. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 797 n.99 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(court stated "[b]ecause the Act imposed deadlines in some areas, we must con-
clude that Congress' failure to impose deadlines elsewhere was not
inadvertent").
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period on SIP revisions, that section was an act of a later Con-
gress and, as such, it did not necessarily show the intent of the
prior Congress which had passed section 1 10(a) (3) (A). 9°
B. The Consequences of EPA Failure to Make a Timely
Review of Revisions
In its analysis of the ramifications of the EPA's failure to act
on a SIP revision within four months, the First Circuit in General
Motors Corp. rejected the analysis of both the Fifth Circuit and the
D.C. Circuit as too "extreme." 9 1 The General Motors Corp. court
rejected the Fifth Circuit's holding in American Cyanamid that
barred collection of penalties until a final ruling, because it failed
to consider the practical reality that the EPA will frequently need
longer than four months to adequately review a proposed revi-
sion.92 Moreover, in dicta the court pointed out that while sec-
tion 110(g) recognized the four month deadline for EPA review of
revisions, section 110(g) did not bar the EPA from collecting pen .
alties for violations of the existing SIP.9s The General Motors Corp.
court also rejected the District of Columbia Circuit's holding, re-
quiring that penalties be held in abeyance until a final resolution,
contending that it failed to provide the EPA with an incentive to
act promptly.94
In an effort to address what the court saw as the inadequacies
of the approaches to this issue by the Fifth and District of Colum-
bia Circuits, the First Circuit in General Motors Corp. attempted to
''steer a middle course between these two extremes.'' 95 The
90. For the text of section 110(g) and a brief discussion of its history, see
supra notes 56 & 57. Though the argument that section 1 10(g) indicates the
intent of the enacting Congress is a strong one, oddly enough only two courts to
date have considered this argument. See United States v. Alcan Foil Products,
889 F.2d 1513, 1518 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
876 F.2d 1060, 1069 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989).
91. For a discussion of the analyses of the Fifth and District of Columbia
Circuits, see supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
92. 876 F.2d at 1067. The court, spoke of a "hierarchy of priorities" and
found the goal of improving the nations air quality as taking precedence over the
states' interest in protecting its businesses. Id.
93. Id. at 1069 n.6. For the text of section 1 10(g) of the CAA, see supra
note 56. The court noted that section 1 I0(g) showed that Congress did not
envision the statute as imposing a mandatory bar on penalties in the event that
the EPA did not make a timely review of the SIP revision. Id. The court also
noted that this section, giving a Governor the power to suspend enforcement of
an existing SIP, would be superfluous if the existing SIP were already unenforce-
able due to the Agency's failure to review within four months. Id.
94. Id. at 1068-69.
95. Id. at 1067.
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court suggested a twofold remedy for instances where the EPA
fails to promptly review SIP revisions. First, the court stated that
after the four month review period a party could attempt to com-
pel agency action pursuant to section 304(a)(2). 96 Second, when
the EPA brings an enforcement action pursuant to section 113,
the district court has the responsibility for assessing the penalty.97
In its evaluation, the court may consider the length and reason for
EPA delay.98 According to the First Circuit in General Motors Corp.,
these two remedies would both create an incentive for the EPA to
act promptly and would not subordinate the public's interest in
cleaner air to the states' interest in tailoring their SIPs as would a
bar on penalties. 99
It is submitted that, had the First Circuit been correct in
holding that the CAA imposed a four month review period, the
court's resolution of this second issue was fair, sound, and consis-
tent with statutory construction. First, the court clearly had the
power to remand the case to the district court to consider the
equities of the case and assess penalties.' 0 0 Specifically, the CAA
empowers the district courts to consider "(in addition to other
factors) the size of the business, the economic penalty on the
business, and the seriousness of the violation."10 Thus, the First
Circuit's holding was consistent with Congress' intent to give the
courts discretion in assessing penalties. Second, the court's hold-
ing, as it noted, avoided rendering section 110(g) superfluous, as
that section does not preclude enforcement under circumstances
where the EPA fails to act promptly on a SIP revision.' 0 2
It is further submitted that each of the circuit courts has
viewed the explicit omission of a statutory deadline for review of
SIP revisions and its consequences as a balance of power problem
under the CAA between the federal government and the states.
The rules developed by each of the circuit courts can be seen as
representing a spectrum of views, each according power to the
96. Id. at 1067-68. For the text of section 304(a), see supra note 62.
97. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
98. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d at 1068.
99. Id.
100. See CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
101. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d at 1068. The court in General Motors
Corp. noted that the "other factors" language of section 113(b) included the
court's consideration of the reasons for the EPA's delay and the prejudice to the
business that may have occurred as a result of such a delay. Id.
102. Id. at 1069 n.6. As was noted supra note 57, section 110(g) was part of
the 1977 Amendments. As a result, this section is merely a persuasive indication
of a prior Congress' intent.
1990] 595
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federal and state governments in different degrees. For example,
the Duquesne Light rule affords the federal government the highest
degree of deference by allowing penalties to be collected retroac-
tively.°10 On the other end of the spectrum, the bar on collection
of penalties opined by the American Cyanamid court tips the bal-
ance in favor of the states' right to tailor their SIPs.t ° 4 The hold-
ing in General Motors Corp. falls between these decisions and
permits the district courts to approach the issue on a case-by-case
basis, weighing the equities of each case and inquiring into the
reasons for EPA delay. 10 5
Absent specific statutory requirements and guidance, the
courts have been left with the task of creating judicial rules based
on conflicting interests. The policy arguments in support of each
circuit court ruling represent the protection of either federal or
state interests. Empirically, it seems certain that the EPA needs
incentives in order to review SIP revisions promptly. 106 Never-
theless, it is the public that suffers when the EPA's power to pe-
nalize is emasculated.
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
In General Motors Corp., Justice Blackmun in a unanimous
opinion presented a detailed analysis of whether or not the CAA
imposed a four month EPA review period for SIP revisions. First,
the Court rejected the argument that the language of either sec-
tion 110(a)(2) or section 110(a)(3) imposed such a deadline. 10 7
The Court contended that the language of section 1 10(a)(3) that
"it meets the requirements of paragraph (2)" meant that the revi-
sion must meet the substantive requirements of section 1 I0(a) (2),
not that the Administrator meet the deadline of that section.' 08
Furthermore, the requirement in section 1 10(a)(3) of notice and
hearing would be redundant if Congress intended to incorporate
the procedural requirements of section 1 10(a)(2).10 9 Second, the
Court noted that Congress in other portions of the CAA explicitly
103. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
106. In General Motors Corp. it took the EPA over two and a half years to
issue a decision on the SIP revision submitted by Massachusetts. 876 F.2d at
1064.
107. General Motors Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
108. Id. at 2532. For the text of section l10(a)(2), see supra note 28. For
the text of section 1 l0(a)(3), see supra note 32.
109. Id.
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imposed deadlines on the Administrator and, therefore, the omis-
sion of a deadline should be regarded as intentional and should
not be inferred.'10 Finally, the Court rejected GMC's contention
that section 1 10(g) required the Administrator to act on revisions
within four months."' The Court stated that while 110(g) pre-
supposes a four month review period for revisions, that "mis-
taken" presupposition is insufficient to create a general
requirement for all revisions."12 On the basis of the above three
points, the Court held that it would not read into the statute a
four month review period.
Turning to the issue of penalties, the Court acknowledged
that although the four month deadline was not applicable, the
EPA was subject to the APA's requirements of acting on matters
within a "reasonable time." 1 3 The Court stated that a section
113 action may be brought by the EPA for violation of the "appli-
cable implementation plan," a phrase statutorily defined as re-
quiring approval by the Administrator.' 1 4 In addition, the Court
noted that Congress had incorporated into the CAA a number of
express bars on enforcement.' 15
VI. CONCLUSION
As the circuit courts developed conflicting rules concerning
the review of SIP revisions, the EPA, states and affected busi-
nesses were uncertain about the consequences of the EPA's fail-
ure to review revisions within four months. Undoubtedly, this
uncertainty hindered the ability of some businesses to plan their
future operations. Perhaps more importantly, the bar placed on
enforcement by some courts curtailed enforcement.
Although the Supreme Court in General Motors Corp. unified
some issues of statutory construction of the CAA, perhaps the
Court is not the best forum to answer the questions that have
110. Id. The Court cited examples in the CAA of instances where Congress
had explicitly included time restraints, including sections 1 l0(a)(3)(b),
110(c)(1), and 113(d)(2).
111. General Motors Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2532.
112. Id. The Court construed section 110(g) as not requiring the Adminis-
trator to take any action, but rather authorizing a governor to suspend an existing
SIP under certain circumstances. Id.
113. Id. For a brief discussion of the APA's requirements vis a vis the EPA,
see supra notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text.
114. Id. at 2533-34. Applicable implementation plans are defined in sec-
tion l10(d) of the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(d).
115. Id. at 2534. The Court noted that section 1 10(d)(10) required such a
bar on enforcement. General Motors Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2534.
1990] 597
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been presented in this note. Congress could, by amending the
CAA to fix a reasonable period for EPA review of SIP revisions,
ensure an incentive for the EPA to timely review revisions, protect
the reliance interest of the states and their industries, and strike a
balance between the EPA's power to enforce the CAA and the
right of states to tailor their SIPs. "16 Moreover, Congress has bet-
ter resources and more time in which to analyze the needs of the
EPA in reviewing SIP revisions than do the courts. While the
"middle course" of the First Circuit and the Supreme Court's de-
cision provide flexibility for the courts in assessing penalties, it
still requires the courts to make a determination of "how much
time is enough time."
If the CAA is amended to specify the time in which the EPA
must act on SIP revisions, the decisions of the First Circuit and
the Supreme Court in General Motors Corp. will assume largely his-
torical significance as an impetus to Congressional action. If
Congress should choose not to amend the CAA to fix a deadline
for EPA review, the Supreme Court's holding will bridge the divi-
sions which existed in the courts of appeals.
Wardell Sanders
116. Currently, both houses of Congress are considering bills which would
amend the CAA and include provisions which would require the EPA to act on
the submission of SIP revisions within twelve months. See S. 1630, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
18
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss2/7
